In the case of Kosovo, a humanitarian intervention was effective in preventing a potential genocide from occurring before it happened. It was reasonable to believe, given Serbia’s recent history of ethnic cleansing, that Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians were at grave risk. But the complexity of the situation must be understood: intervention was blocked by the UN Security Council, and NATO was forced to act unilaterally.

The implicit rationale for NATO activity was that the Security Council had been derelict in its responsibilities. This dereliction did not change the urgency of the situation or make it any less justifiable to intervene; rather, it shifted the responsibility to other willing parties, just as responsibility shifts to the ICC when national governments refuse to prosecute certain crimes that fall under their jurisdiction (see “The International Criminal Court (ICC)”).

In the end, the mission’s success was its own justification. In the eyes of many, this is true for all humanitarian interventions. In the nineteenth century, the British statesman Sir William V. Harcourt argued, “As in the case of revolution, its [intervention’s] essence is its illegality and its justification is its success.”¹ While this principle may be true, it does not make it any easier for policymakers to judge when intervention is appropriate before undertaking it.

Although the twentieth century saw an increasing number of precedents, such as Congo in 1961 (approved by the UN) and Bangladesh in 1971 (which was roundly condemned) and gradually more widespread acceptance of the notion of humanitarian intervention, most experts believe intervention will remain a rarely employed last resort. Even the success of Kosovo is sobering: “NATO’s decision to rely on air strikes rather than ground forces also led many to conclude that major powers remain so intolerant of casualties that humanitarian interventions will remain rare.²

Cynics maintain that the primary consideration for countries to intervene will always be the extent to which their own strategic interests are at stake. This explains the reluctance of the West to intervene in African genocides, such as those in Rwanda and Darfur, where few strategic interests are at stake. When the international community wants to intervene, the institutional mechanisms that facilitate interventionist actions through the UN are relatively weak.³

The proper scope of humanitarian intervention will remain an important question for the 21st century, as the international community continues to debate proactive ways to prevent the most egregious violations of human rights, particularly in the case of genocide.

1  de Waal.

2  Dietrich.

3  Donnelly 169-170; Falk 178-183.

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