On Christmas Day 2009, 23 year-old Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab tried to blow up Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines flight 253 departing from Amsterdam. The young Islamic fundamentalist attempted to detonate explosives that were smuggled onto the aircraft under his clothing and undetected by airport security.

Undeniably classified as an “attempted act of terrorism,” the Obama administration and the Department of Homeland Security have taken this breach of American defenses and its linkages to the al-Qaeda terrorist network very seriously. Fortunately, Mutallab was overrun by passengers and failed to detonate the device. The suspect, Mutallab, has claimed that he was directed and trained by al-Qaeda leaders in Yemen.¹ 

On January 7, 2010, President Obama addressed the attack and the several failings of the US security system for not anticipating and thus preventing the attempted bombing. President Obama reiterated that America remains “at war” with al-Qaeda and its affiliates.² 

The President underscored the potential for another al-Qaeda-sponsored attack and stressed the increasing vulnerability of individual loners to be recruited to the terrorist network. Al-Qaeda has preyed upon the weak in failing states, such as Somalia and Yemen, by setting up terrorist cells, spreading their fundamentalist version of Islam, and ultimately targeting the United States.

Globalization and a Network of Terror

This incident shines light, once again, upon the stateless, mobile, and diffused al-Qaeda network that has remained a priority in US foreign policy and defense since the September 11th attacks. The al-Qaeda network, thanks to increasing modes of communication and movement of persons, ideas, and information, has reached far beyond its birthplace in the Middle East. The Obama administration has begun to assess new reforms for preventing another attack on US soil and on US nationals abroad, as US homeland security remains at serious risk.

The chart below from Al-Jazeera-English highlights the suspected locations of al-Qaeda cells across the Middle East, Northern and Eastern Africa, and Southeast Asia.

 
Al-Qaeda is Arabic for “The Base” and was founded by Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s.³  The central goal of the international terrorist organization is to rid Muslim countries of what it considers to be a widespread Western influence. The network seeks to replace these governments with a fundamentalist Islamic regime based on a strict interpretation of Islamic law known as sharia.

The network is a fluid conglomeration of nationals of several different states, who are dedicated to this form of Islam and who have fervent hatred of all things deemed “western.” The leadership of the organization comes from many countries—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan, Mauritania, Jordan, the Comoro Islands, Indonesia, and others. The network continues to grow and set down roots in countries throughout the world. The penetration of this terror movement has been helped, in large part, by its leaders’ ability to infiltrate new regions.

The chart below summarizes a handful of the top leaders and associates of the network as recorded by msnbc.com

Osama bin Laden- Saudi	The undisputed leader of the network
Ayman al-Zawahiri- Egyptian	Former head of the Egyptian jihad when it merged with al-Qaeda in 2001
Saif Saif al-Din al-Ansari al-Adel-Egyptian	Considered al-Qaeda’s “No 3” and chief military commander
Amin al-Haq- Afghan	Bin Laden’s personal security coordinator
Suleiman Abu Ghaith- Kuwaiti	Al-Qaeda’s spokesman

Al-Qaeda has no single headquarters, which contributes to the group’s fluidity and mobility. From 1991 to 1996, al-Qaeda worked primarily from Pakistan along the Afghan border. However, once the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan, the operatives switched bases within the borders of Afghanistan. Following the US-led war in Afghanistan in 2001 and the Taliban’s eventual defeat, al-Qaeda’s leadership moved, once again, into the tribal areas of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan.

However, as has been demonstrated by the most recent attempt of terrorism on Christmas day, the network spans well beyond Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the wider Middle East. Noted affiliate groups have sprung up in Iraq, Yemen, and North Africa. Officials say that al-Qaeda has underground cells in approximately 100 countries, including the United States.⁴ 

Al-Qaeda has also sought connection to other terrorist organizations that share al-Qaeda’s Sunni Muslim fundamentalism. Among these groups are:

• Egyptian Islamic Jihad
• The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
• Islamic Army of Aden (Yemen)
• Jama’at al-Tawhid wal Jihad (Iraq)
• Armed Islamic Group (Algeria)
• Abu Sayyaf Group (Malaysia, Philippines)
• Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
• Hezbollah (Lebanon)
• Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

Globalization has certainly helped facilitate such connections among these radical Sunni groups. Al-Qaeda has undoubtedly used the Internet as a means of mass communication among its followers and potential followers to spread its mission. The al-Qaeda media nexus is a powerful tool used to disseminate its interests and ideas. Professor Bruce Hoffman at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service explains, “Terrorism is a form of violent communication.”⁵ 

Hoffman cites hidden online mechanisms used to proliferate al-Qaeda’s message. In July 2004, al-Qaeda computer expert Mohamed Naem Noor Khan was captured by Pakistani authorities revealing the network’s unprecedented high-tech intelligence.⁶  Similarly, a report emerged from Britain in October 2008 that Islamic fanatics were openly recruiting children via the Internet. These suspected websites were allegedly distributing propaganda material in favor of al-Qaeda.⁷ 

Effective communication has always been an essential part of al-Qaeda’s strategy, but email and the Internet have become even more important in the recent years as the movement has proliferated outside of the Middle East. Interestingly, Major Nidal Hasan, the Army psychiatrist accused of killing 13 people at the Fort Hood, Texas Army base, is reported to have communicated with a radical Islamic cleric in Yemen via his website.

Since the loss of the Afghanistan base in 2001, al-Qaeda has stepped up its operatives in locations outside of the Middle East in search of individuals who are susceptible to the draws of joining such an operation based on radical religious views. There has been a serious focus on “Internet Imams” as al-Qaeda recruiters who wield their “Internet celebrity” to indoctrinate young Muslims with extreme ideology.⁸

Al-Qaeda Reaching Troubled Yemen

In the last few years, Yemen, located in the Middle East and bordering Oman and Saudi Arabia, has become increasingly weak and fragmented reaching an “at risk” status on Foreign Policy’s 2009 Failed State Index.⁹ 

Yemen has become an ideal terrorist haven with its poverty-stricken population and weak central government. Additionally, Yemen has many outlying areas with porous borders susceptible to armed tribal groups and internal fractionalization.

Also significant is Somalia’s geographical proximity to Yemen, a state that is also battling its own Islamic insurgencies and al-Qaeda influences. Al-Shabab, a youth organization with known ties to al-Qaeda, is Somalia’s largest Islamic militia. A Horn of Africa expert explains, “The similarity between Yemen and Somalia is that they are tribal societies, they have conservative social norms, and they both had weak states unable to provide services to the people.”¹⁰

Yemen’s connection to the Christmas day incident is well documented. The suspected terrorist, Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, is the son of a Nigerian banker and enjoyed private, international education in the United Kingdom. He turned to radical Islam and underwent al-Qaeda training on how to detonate an explosive aboard the Detroit-bound flight on December 25, 2009. Mutallab knowingly cut off all ties to his family prior to undergoing terrorist training and prior to leaving Yemen. Mutallab traveled to Yemen under the guise of learning Arabic on two separate occasions.¹¹  Reports have surfaced that Mutallab lived with an al-Qaeda leader for approximately one month with no contact with the outside world in order to be trained.

Vulnerable youths brought to Yemen are prime suspects for al-Qaeda operations. These youths are easily lured into the fundamentalism and into false security offered by the network.

Fighting a “Globalized” and Stateless Enemy

Terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda form part of a unique group of enemies that are considered stateless. They practice asymmetric, non-traditional warfare that is both unpredictable and exceedingly difficult to combat. These individuals, like Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, are willing to sacrifice their own lives for a pronounced belief in something greater than earthly living. This combination of religious fanaticism and gruesome violence make fighting al-Qaeda a monumental, but necessary, task.

Perhaps the most dangerous element of the war on al-Qaeda is the deep worldwide penetration of this network and its ability to infiltrate societies not confined by geographic space.

For further reading, please consult:

• “Terror in the Sky,” The Economist
• Al-Qaeda Background
• Backgrounder from the Council on Foreign Relations: Al-Qaeda 
• Interactive Map: Al-Qaeda Attacks Worldwide: Center for American Progress
• “Al-Qaeda: A Global Phenomenon Reaching Maturity,” from the International Analyst Network
• Al-Qaeda Leaders and Associates- Top operatives
• “Cells from Hell,” United States Action Organization
• Failed States Index 2009